ABSTRACT A chaotic multilevel separated encryption (CMSE) scheme is proposed for physical layer security enhancement of orthogonal frequency division multiplexing passive optical network (OFDM-PON). In the proposed scheme, symbols in an OFDM signal are divided into several sub-matrices by matrix mapping and then encrypted by different algorithms selected from a set of alternative encryption algorithms based on 1D logistic chaotic systems separately. The signal processed by this scheme is encrypted at four levels. The four encryption levels depend on a matrix mapping rule, the specific algorithms, the order of used encryption algorithms and the key of each chaotic system. Any one of these conditions is essential for proper decryption. Compared with traditional methods, this scheme adds two new encryption levels and replaces the unique employed algorithm with multiple algorithms, which improves the security of system at the expense of a slightly increased complexity. An encrypted signal transmission of 22.06 Gb/s bit rate is successfully demonstrated over a back-to-back (BTB) system and a 25-km standard single mode fiber (SSMF). The experimental results prove that the CMSE scheme does not deteriorate the system performance and has good security against illegal attacks for future access networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing passive optical network (OFDM-PON) is considered as a hopeful solution to provide large broadband and low-cost services for next generation multi-user access networks, which is mainly due to its advantages like flexible resource allocation, high spectrum efficiency, strong robustness against fiber dispersion and so on [1] , [2] . However, because of the large number of users, frequent service interactions and the broadcasting architecture from an optical line terminal (OLT) to optical network units (ONUs) [3] , OFDM-PON is facing challenges in data transmission security like malicious eavesdropping. Many encryption schemes are implemented in the application and media access layers, mainly using
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Maurizio Magarini. authentication and access control methods, but they have shortcomings as the complex key management and lack of protection for control data and headers [4] . Compared with the upper layers, the physical layer is located at the bottom of the entire Open System Interconnection (OSI) model. It can perform many operations like modulation and coding and has a good random source, which is important for the security of a communication system. Therefore, the security enhancement technology completed on the physical layer has potential advantages like diverse implementation methods and effective protection of the whole data. Owing to the high randomness and sensitivity to the initial values, the application of chaotic theories in physical layer encryption has attracted intense research interests. Various encryption schemes have been reported, for instance, chaotic matrix transformation [3] , [5] , coding-based encryption [4] , [6] , Brownian motion encryption [7] , [8] , noise-like constellation mapping [9] , active constellation extension [10] , constellation scrambling and permutation [11] - [13] , fractional Fourier transformation [14] , optimal sequence transmission [15] - [17] , pilot-aided secure key agreement [18] , digital filter multiple access (DFMA)-PON [19] , fixed-point chaos [20] , photonic Duffing system [21] and 3-dimension multi scrolls chaotic encryption [22] . Among these methods, the method proposed in [9] leads to an increase in transmission power and bit error rate (BER) due to the randomness of constellation mapping. In [14] , the relationship between the system security and transmission performance is flexibly adjusted, but the computational complexity is high. Furthermore, to resist the chosen plaintext attacks (CPAs), phase rotation [23] and chaotic nonlinear encryption [24] have been studied. In [23] , the reuse of incorrect data leads to the noise accumulation, causing the BER performance reduction of ∼1dB in sensitivity. Although the chaotic nonlinear encryption [24] has a high scrambling degree and a strong ability to resist CPAs, the computational complexity cannot be ignored, which is owing to multiple XOR operations and the application of a certain constant amplitude zero autocorrelation (CAZAC) matrix. All the reported methods [3] - [24] use a single algorithm to encrypt all symbols in an OFDM signal, and they have two encryption levels depending on the used algorithm and the secure keys. On this basis, the security of data transmission can be improved by enhancing the encryption level, but such studies have not been reported.
In this paper, we propose a chaotic multilevel separated encryption (CMSE) scheme aiming at the physical layer security enhancement of OFDM-PON. A frame of OFDM signal is transformed into a plane matrix and divided into several sub-matrices with the help of a pre-set matrix mapping rule. Multiple algorithms are selected from a set of encryption algorithms based on 1D logistic chaotic systems to encrypt the sub-matrices respectively. Finally, the encrypted sub-matrices are rearranged to a new matrix and sent as a transmitted signal after subsequent processing. To decrypt this signal accurately, the matrix mapping rule, the specific encryption algorithms, the applied order of encryption algorithms and the secure keys of chaotic systems should be obtained, which means that the signal is encrypted at four encryption levels.
II. PRINCIPLES A. FOUR ENCRYPTION LEVELS
The schematic diagram of proposed CMSE scheme and the detailed illustrations of encryption levels 1, 2, and 3 are depicted in Fig. 1 . At the transmitter, the input pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS) is firstly completed serial-to-parallel (S/P) conversion and modulated by 16-QAM mapping. Secondly, the modulated data are transformed into a plane matrix M by the subcarrier allocation. Namely, an OFDM signal is seen as a QAM matrix, and each symbol of the signal can be regarded as a point in the matrix. On this basis, the matrix M is then encrypted at four levels. This process is completed in the matrix mapping and separated encryption in Fig. 1 , which is described as follows.
The encryption level 1 is achieved by matrix mapping. The matrix M is divided into n sub-matrices as plotted in Fig. 1 (a) , where the division obeys a special mapping rule R. The division process is defined as
The matrix mapping rule R is freely set, which should be considered comprehensively in terms of the size of transmission data and the requirement of data disturbance. The rule R can adopt the proposed methods like interleaved partition, adjacent partition and random partition [15] . It can also employ some new customized approaches, such as an extraction based on data distribution characteristics or a mixed use of multiple classification methods. The encryption levels 2 and 3 are accomplished by separated encryption. The encryption level 2 is to establish a set of available chaotic-based encryption algorithms ψ and select m (m ≤ n) kinds of encryption algorithms from ψ for use. Assume that the ψ is implemented and expressed as ψ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕs} ,
where s is the total number of encryption algorithms. The ψ can contain existing encryption schemes as well as new research schemes. Only the encryption algorithm that improves or slightly affects the BER performance of a signal can be added into ψ, and the method with the deteriorated BER performance can't be included in it. Then we choose m kinds of chaotic-based algorithms from ψ for the separated encryption, as illustrated in Fig. 1(b) . Note that the selected VOLUME 7, 2019 algorithms are expressed as ϕ i1 , . . . , ϕ im and the available combination of them is A m s (i.e., s(s − 1)(s − 2) . . . (s − m)). When m < n, some sub-matrices are allowed to be encrypted in the same way; otherwise, all sub-matrices are encrypted by different algorithms individually. For the selection of encryption algorithms, the requirements of different users or transmission data types for the encryption degree (i.e., general encryption or special encryption) and system performance should be taken into account.
The encryption level 3 is to determine the applied order of these chosen encryption algorithms. Once the encryption algorithms are determined, they can be arranged in various orders. And the order applied in separated encryption will directly affect the structure of encrypted data. Therefore, the order of these algorithms must be decided in the encryption level 3. In Fig. 1(c) , the relationship between the applied order and data structure is briefly shown by taking the application of two different algorithms for n sub-matrices separated encryption as an example, in which the same algorithm is labeled with the same color. Since the encryption algorithms can be ordered in multiple ways, the CMSE scheme has the ability to resist CPAs. Based on Fig. 1(c) , the following situations are analyzed: (1) When the plaintext intercepted by illegal attackers is only encrypted by one algorithm, it is assumed that the attackers can obtain the encryption algorithm by analyzing the relevant information between the plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext. But the remaining plaintext remains undecipherable to the attackers since they don't understand the mapping rule R and the other used encryption algorithm. (2) If the intercepted plaintext is encrypted by two algorithms, it is difficult for attackers to get any useful information. Taking an extreme case into consideration, we assume that the attackers have got the encryption algorithms. However, the remaining plaintext is still unable to be deciphered accurately because of the unknown R.
The encryption level 4 is generated by the secure keys. The secure keys consist of the matrix mapping parameters and initial values of chaotic systems. The data decryption is straightly related to whether the matrix mapping is done correctly, so its parameters are required. And all used encryption algorithms are controlled by chaotic digital random sequences, so the chaotic initial values are needed. Since the total number of desired chaotic sequences depends on the selected algorithms, we only discuss the proposed CMSE scheme based on 1D logistic chaotic systems in this paper. When the number of them is determined, other hyperchaotic systems are also applicable. Static key distribution technique is then adopted to pre-share the secure keys between the OLT and ONUs.
After the matrix mapping and separated encryption, all sub-matrices are rearranged to a new matrix M based on the inverse mapping rule R − and then converted from frequency domain to time domain by the inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT). The subsequent operations include the cyclic prefix (CP) insertion and parallel-to-serial (P/S) conversion.
When these steps are realized in the OLT, the signal is transmitted. The demodulation and decryption processes are performed in ONUs.
In this scheme, the matrix mapping and separated encryption mess up the relationship between symbols and lead to an increase in structural uncertainty and unpredictability of a signal. To recover the encrypted signal correctly, the mapping rule R, m kinds of encryption algorithms selected from ψ, their applied order and the secure keys are needed, which indicates that the data are encrypted at four levels. However, for conventional encryption schemes [3] - [24] , when the unique encryption method and the secure keys are obtained, the data are available to be decrypted. By comparison, we add two encryption levels in the proposed CMSE scheme, which improves the randomness of data and provides better security for OFDM-PON. After the matrix mapping, the independent row and column scrambling and matrix precoding algorithms are utilized to encrypt the two sub-matrices. A 1D logistic chaotic system is employed to generate a digital random sequence, which is written as [25] 
where γ (3.57 < γ ≤ 4) is the bifurcation parameter, i denotes the i-th iteration, and x i stands for the outcome of i-th iteration. A chaotic sequence {ẋ} is generated after several iterations and its value changes from 0 to 1. In this way, another chaotic sequences {ẏ}, {ż} and {u} are obtained by using (3) three times. The sequences {ẋ} and {ẏ} are used for the matrix M 1 encryption, whereas the sequences {ż} and {u} are applied to the matrix M 2 encryption. For the encryption of matrix M 1 , we adopt the similar row and column scrambling algorithm proposed in [13] to verify the compatibility of existing encryption technology and the CMSE scheme. Experimental results in [13] have proved that the method only has a slight impact on the BER of a signal. Different from [13] , we only perform the row and column scrambling once. An index vector D x served as the reference for row scrambling is generated from the element permutation of the sequence {ẋ}, which is expressed as
where arrange(.) returns the indexes of sorted elements, i(i = 1, 2, . . . , A) represents the current index of an element, and the value of d i is equal to the original index of an element in the sequence {ẋ}. The element permutation in (4) is carried out according to the value of a randomly selected point in the sequence {ẋ}, which can be briefly shown by an example in Fig. 3 . In the element permutation, the data smaller than the reference point are moved to the places in front of it, whereas the larger data are placed behind. After that, moving the reference point to the first place of the sequence completes this processing. Eventually, the original indexes of sorted elements compose the index vector D x . When D x is utilized to scramble the rows of matrix M 1 , the d i -th row is moved to the i-th row, realizing the randomization of row data. With the same operations, an index vector D y is then obtained from the sequence {ẏ} and the order of column data is completely reset. Relied on D x and D y , the matrix M 1 is transformed into an encrypted matrix M 1 by the row and column scrambling. The encryption of matrix M 2 is achieved by matrix precoding. Suppose that there is a matrix F, which has the same size as the matrix M 2 . The matrix F is set as
where F α,β stands for an element in the matrix F, α and β (1≤ α, β ≤ A) represent the row and column indexes of an element, b and d are real constants, and A is the subcarrier number of matrix M 2 . In order to raise the randomness of matrix F, we make use of the chaotic sequences {ż} and {u} to create two series of real constants as coordinate-based parameters to replace b and d in (5). The operation conducted to each value in the sequences can be expressed as
where Ext(z α ,k) returns the k-th digit in the decimal part of the α-th value in {ż}, Ext(u β , k) returns the k-th digit in the decimal part of the β-th value in {u}, λ k and ρ k stand for the processing coefficients respectively, and K is the total number of selected digits. The output of z[α] denotes the α-th real constant in a newly gener-
. . , z[A]], and u[β]
expresses the β-th real constant in a newly generated
The real constants in the sequences Z and U are then treated as coordinate-based parameters to reconfigure the matrix F, and (5) is re-written as
The encrypted matrix M 2 is obtained by matrix precoding as
here, · represents the matrix point multiplication. After these steps, two encrypted matrices M 1 and M 2 are rearranged to a new matrix M according to the inverse mapping rule R − and sent as the transmission data after subsequent processing. 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In order to analyze the characteristics of the CMSE scheme, we set the parameters [A, B, C, D Firstly, we simulate the bifurcation diagram of a 1D logistic chaotic system with a step length of 0.005 in the range of 1 ≤ γ ≤ 4, as shown in Fig. 4 , where the initial value is equal to that of the chaotic sequence {ẋ}. Based on this curve, we set γ = 4 to ensure this system working in a good chaotic state. The sensitivity of the 1D chaotic system to initial values and parameters is the basis for the sensitivity of the CMSE scheme, so we test the performance of sequence {ẋ}. When the initial values of sequence {ẋ} are equal to 0.826587342380915 and 0.826587342380916 respectively and γ = 4, the sensitivity of sequence {ẋ} is as shown in Fig. 5(a) . When the initial value of sequence {ẋ} is equal to 0.826587342380915 and the parameters (γ ) are equal to 3.999999999999999 and 4.000000000000000 respectively, the sensitivity of sequence {ẋ} is as shown in Fig. 5(b) . It can be seen that the chaotic system is highly sensitive to initial values and parameters, and these chaotic sequences are different with an initial value or parameter difference of 10 −15 . Besides, we randomly test the auto-correlation and cross-correlation of sequence {ẏ}, as shown in Fig. 6 , which displays the chaotic system has good randomness.
Secondly, we simulate the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) curves of PAPR for a standard OFDM signal and a CMSE encryption signal, as shown in Fig. 7 . It can be seen that the two CCDF curves are almost coincident, which indicates that the CMSE scheme does not introduce the PAPR performance deterioration. Key space is also treated as an important indicator to evaluate an encryption scheme. The combination of different encryption methods will result in different key spaces for the CMSE system. In this example, the parameters D, E, K , γ and chaotic initial values are severed as the secure keys. For the matrix mapping, due to various choices of parameters D and E, (B/D-C/D+1) kinds of mapping rules are obtained for key space expansion. In the encryption of matrix M 1 , the independent row and column scrambling leads to an increase of A × (B-A) in the key space due to the random selection of a reference point.
In the encryption of matrix M 2 , a key space of 9×K ×A×A is generated, where the value range of a processing coefficient corresponding to a digit taken from the decimal part results in a key space of 9. Moreover, the key space that each chaotic digital sequence can provide is about [(4−3.57)+1]×10 15 = 1.43 × 10 15 , so four sequences with different initial values create a key space of (1.43 × 10 15 ) 4 = 4.18 × 10 60 . Thus, the total key space is (200/5−80/5+1)×120×(200−120)× 9 × 15 × 120 × 120 × 4.18 × 10 60 = 1.95 × 10 72 . The key space comparisons of the CMSE system in this example and other reported methods are shown in Table 1 . It can be seen that although the key space of the CMSE scheme is not the largest, it is sufficient to provide a good anti-eavesdropping capability for data. And the main reason why the key space of CMSE scheme in this example is not large compared to other methods is that it only carried out the signal disturbance once. In order to obtain a larger key space, multiple symbol disturbances can be performed in the selected method [13] of this example, or other encryption methods that obtain large key spaces can be utilized. In addition, the average reuse period of a chaotic sequence is T∼ 2 (0.45±0.05)PD [26] , where P is the calculation accuracy of the computer and D is the dimension of the chaotic system. In this paper, we use a 64-bit computer for simulation, so P = 64, D = 1, and T∼ 2 (0.45±0.05)×64 . A hyperchaotic system can be utilized to obtain chaotic sequences with larger periods, thus improving the security of the system. Thirdly, we assess the computational complexity of the CMSE scheme. The total complexity is the sum of the complexity of matrix mapping and each sub-matrix operation. Different encryption methods and matrix mapping rules will result in different complexity of the whole system. We compare the CMSE scheme in this example and two involved algorithms in Table 2 . All of them are used to encrypt the same data (9.6 × 10 4 symbols) under the equal experimental conditions. In Table 2 , we use numbers to represent the steps or sequences required for each indicator. In the matrix mapping and algorithm sorting, ''1'' and ''0'' indicate whether this step is needed. It can be seen that although the CMSE scheme adds the steps of matrix mapping and encryption algorithm sorting, the computational complexity of each encryption algorithm is reduced and the obtained key space is the largest compared to the independent use of the corresponding method. And the complexity of matrix mapping is low, so the total complexity of CMSE scheme does not increase too much. When the total computational complexity is higher than using a single encryption algorithm, the benefit of using CMSE is that it increases the structural uncertainty of the encrypted signal, making it impossible for attackers to decrypt the entire signal based on the fragment information. In a single-method encryption scheme, once the method is deciphered, it is easy for attackers to obtain all the information. This deciphering process is difficult, but using multiple methods for hybrid encryption will make the decryption become harder and provide better security for the system at the expense of a slightly increased complexity. As for the reduction of total complexity, it can be comprehensively considered in the selection of matrix mapping rule and encryption methods. Fourthly, we simulate the BERs of the CMSE schemes with different orders of the two methods in this example. When using MATLAB to complete the simulation, the Gaussian white noise and the loss and dispersion of a fiber are added to simulate the real transmission situation. The BER results of different ordered CMSE schemes are shown in Table 3 , where the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is increased by 1.5 dB in each simulation. It can be seen that the CMSE schemes with different method orders have almost the same impact on the BER of a signal. Thus, different orders of encryption methods only increase the structural uncertainty of a signal and the difficulty of illegal attackers in signal deciphering, but will not cause differences in system performance. Finally, we conduct an experiment based on the example to test our scheme, and the experimental setup is illustrated in Fig. 8 . A PRBS with a length of 9.6 × 10 4 is generated at the transmitter and transformed into a plane matrix M (120 × 200) by S/P conversion, 16-QAM mapping and subcarrier allocation. Therefore, the subcarrier number of matrix M is 120 and each subcarrier has 200 symbols. The matrix M is divided into 5 parts by columns and continuous column data with a length of 16 are extracted from the same location in each part. All the extracted data constitute the matrix M 1 , whereas the remaining data are spliced into the matrix M 2 . Then the matrix M 1 is encrypted by the row and column scrambling algorithm and the matrix M 2 is encrypted by the matrix precoding algorithm. After that, they are rearranged to an encrypted matrix M according to the inverse matrix mapping rule R − . After subsequent processing, the matrix M is sent as a transmission signal. The IFFT size is 256, of which 120 subcarriers carry the 16-QAM encrypted data and another 120 subcarriers are loaded with the corresponding complex conjugate data to meet the Hermitian symmetry requirement, so as to realize the output of real-value signal. A CP of 1/16 is added in the data sequence for preventing symbol interference. A total of 272 OFDM symbols are generated. These operations are conducted offline by using MATLAB. In the next step, the signal is uploaded into an arbitrary waveform generator (AWG Tektronix 7102A) with a sampling rate of 12.5 GSa/s to complete a digital-to-analog conversion (DAC). A laser diode (LD) with a working wavelength of 1550 nm and an output power of 14.60 dBm is applied as the optical source. The encrypted signal is modulated onto the optical carrier by a single-drive Mach-Zehnder modulator (MZM) with a bandwidth of 10GHz, where the MZM operates at a quadrature point with a bias voltage of 1.5V and an output power of 0 dBm. The light signal ultimately transmits through a 25-km standard single mode fiber (SSMF), and the received optical power is adjusted by a tunable optical attenuator (TOA). When the light signal has been detected by a photodetector (PD) with a bandwidth of 10GHz, a digital phosphor oscilloscope (DPO Tektronix TDS 7404B) with a sampling rate of 25 GSa/s is used to record it. The total bit rate of a signal is equal to (subcarrier number × bit number × AWG sampling rate/IFFT size/(1+CP)). So in this experiment, the bit rate is (120 × 4 × 12.5 × 10 9 /256/(1 + 1/16)) = 22.06Gb/s. The signal demodulation and decryption processes are also done offline. Fig. 9 displays the measured BERs of signals received by a legal ONU and an illegal ONU, and the insertion is a constellation diagram of a 25-km SSMF transmission signal received by the legal ONU. It can be found that for a legal ONU, the BERs of encrypted and unencrypted signals are basically the same, which proves that the transmission performance of CMSE scheme is similar to that of a standard OFDM system. The BER performance of signals transmitted through the back-to-back (BTB) system is about 1dB (@10 −3 ) received optical power lower than that of SSMF transmission, which is mainly due to the fiber dispersion. For an illegal ONU, the BERs of received signals are always close to 0.5. The results are consistent with the conclusion we discussed above. Only the legal user with knowledge of the four essential conditions, namely the matrix mapping rule R, the specific encryption algorithms, their applied order and the secure keys, can recover the data successfully. Thus, the CMSE scheme is confirmed to have good security. Moreover, according to the PAPR and BER results, the CMSE scheme that combines the reported algorithm [13] with the other new research algorithm does not lead to the degradation of system performance, which also verifies the compatibility of CMSE scheme with existing encryption technology.
IV. CONCLUSION
In order to improve the physical layer security of OFDM-PON, we have proposed and experimentally verified a chaotic multilevel separated encryption scheme. An encrypted signal transmission of 22.06 Gb/s bit rate has been successfully demonstrated over a BTB system and a 25-km SSMF. From the characteristics and experimental results of this scheme, we can know as follows:
1) The proposed scheme uses multiple algorithms to replace the unique algorithm in a conventional encryption scheme. The scheme adds two steps of matrix mapping and encryption algorithm sorting, which can enhance the security of data transmission by increasing the encryption level. The matrix mapping and separated encryption enhance the structural uncertainty and unpredictability of a transmission signal. Therefore, in order to properly recover the signal encrypted by this scheme, it is necessary to obtain the matrix mapping rule, the specific encryption algorithms, their applied order and the secure keys.
2) The matrix mapping rule and adopted encryption algorithms are changeable, and the CMSE scheme is compatible with currently reported methods. The transmission performance of this scheme is similar to that of a standard OFDM system. It provides better security for the entire system at the expense of a slightly increased complexity. Besides, it also has the ability to resist the CPAs.
3) The proposed CMSE scheme is not only suited for the signal transmission of one user, but also applicable to a LAN. Namely, users in a LAN can be divided into several parts and encrypted in different ways.
